“The integrity of adjudication is not just a virtue—it is the essence of justice.”
The Jurisprudential Crossroads
In an era where arbitration is no longer confined to territorial silos, the friction between party autonomy and judicial restraint continues to generate seismic tremors in the legal landscape. The recent decision of the Delhi High Court in Engineering Projects (India) Ltd. v. MSA Global LLC (Oman) reasserts a fundamental constitutional principle—courts are not mute spectators when the arbitration process degenerates into a theatre of oppression.
The Court was confronted with a seemingly paradoxical prayer: to injunct an ongoing ICC arbitration seated in Singapore. At first blush, the plea appears to contravene the canon of minimal judicial interference. Yet, delve deeper, and one discovers that the soul of the prayer was not to subvert the arbitration clause but to preserve justice itself.
The Crux of the Controversy
The Plaintiff, a Government of India enterprise, challenged the continuance of ICC arbitral proceedings on grounds of non-disclosure by the arbitrator—Mr. Andre Yeap, SC—of prior professional engagements with the defendant’s promoter. The Defendant dismissed this as inconsequential, relying on the rejection of the challenge by the ICC Court and subsequent anti-suit injunctions secured from the Singapore High Court.
But the High Court of Delhi didn’t merely examine procedural technicalities; it embarked upon a constitutional journey—asking not what the law permits, but what justice demands.
The Legal Tapestry: Maintainability & Jurisdiction
In a reasoned exegesis of Section 9 CPC and the Dhulabhai doctrine, the Court held that civil courts are presumed to have jurisdiction unless expressly or impliedly excluded. And where arbitral proceedings are shown to be vexatious, oppressive, or contrary to public policy, civil courts may justifiably intervene.
The Court rejected the sweeping proposition that the foreign seat (Singapore) ipso facto ousts jurisdiction of Indian courts. Drawing upon ONGC v. Western Co. of North America (1987) and Dabhol Power Co., it held that an anti-arbitration injunction is not alien to Indian jurisprudence. Rather, it is a shield of last resort when the process threatens to devour the very justice it claims to uphold.
The Litmus of Vexatiousness: A Judicial Calibration
The Court fashioned a litmus test to determine when an arbitral proceeding is “vexatious” or “oppressive”:
- Disclosure Violations: Mr. Yeap’s failure to disclose prior involvement with the defendant’s promoter, and the ICC’s characterisation of this as merely “regrettable,” was found insufficient.
- Conduct of the Tribunal: Despite knowing the pendency of proceedings in India, the Tribunal pressed on with evidentiary hearings. This reflected, in the Court’s view, an abandonment of procedural fairness.
- Comity and Coordination: While respecting foreign judicial orders, the Court emphasized that comity does not demand judicial abdication when Indian public policy and principles of natural justice are in peril.
Judicial Intervention: Not a Sword, But a Shield
Crucially, the judgment doesn’t dilute the doctrine of arbitration autonomy—it reinforces it by clarifying its limits. It serves as a warning to parties that forum shopping, aggressive procedural tactics, and evasion of fair adjudicationwill not be allowed to masquerade as “arbitral process.”
Indeed, arbitration cannot be reduced to an “escape room” from judicial morality. The Delhi High Court’s ruling becomes a lighthouse in turbulent waters—asserting that constitutional courts will intervene when the foundations of neutrality and due process are under attack.
Final Thoughts
The judgment is a wake-up call to international arbitral institutions as well. The refusal to remove an arbitrator despite clear conflict of interest signals a disturbing complacency in the global arbitral order.
In reaffirming the jurisdiction of Indian courts to protect Indian public sector entities from coercive and unjust foreign proceedings, the Court does not act parochially—it acts constitutionally.
When arbitration is conducted in a manner that assaults the conscience of fairness, it is not arbitration. It is a farce dressed in robes of legality. And the Constitution does not permit courts to be silent spectators to a farce.
Disclaimer
This blog is intended solely for academic and informational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice or a legal opinion of any kind. For a thorough understanding of legal implications, one must consider the specific facts and governing law of each case.